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Abstract 
 
Pre-school children‟s recall of both experienced and non-experienced activities 
was examined across three interviews. One hundred and six children aged 4 to 5 years 
(58 males, 48 females) from both low and high socioeconomic status areas 
participated in an event called the Deakin Activities, which consisted of two 
experienced activities. One or two days later, the children were asked to recall what 
happened in the two activities and an activity they had not experienced which was 
suggested to have occurred along with the experienced activities. Next, children were 
given false suggestions about one of the experienced (true-biased) activities and the 
non-experienced (false) activity. For the remaining experienced (true-unbiased) 
activity, no questions were asked. Three and eight days after the activities were 
presented, children were again required to recall all three activities in their own words 
while a variety of suggestive techniques were used as encouragers. The results 
revealed that irrespective of the SES group, assent rates across the true and false 
activities became more similar after the first interview. Furthermore, children's 
narratives about the false activity became more similar in detail, structure and quality 
to their narratives about the true activities across interviews. However, the rate of 
fantastic/improbable details was higher for the false activity compared to the true 
activities, children reported more interviewer suggestions about the false activity than 
the true-biased activity, and there were fewer confabulation errors reported about the 
false activity compared to the true activities. The implications of the results are 
discussed. 
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It is well established that preschoolers‟ recall of events is particularly 
susceptible to contamination from false information provided by an interviewer. 
While all children (as well as adults) can be misled by an interviewer‟s false 
suggestions, children aged four to six years are most vulnerable to suggestion (Ceci 
and Bruck, 1993). The heightened suggestibility of preschool children, coupled with 
the increasing involvement of preschoolers in the justice system (Ceci and Bruck, 
1995), has led many child eyewitness memory researchers to focus on the 
performance of this age group. Overall, the work to date has helped to define the 
general impact of various interviewing techniques, and has provided a framework for 
the development of investigative interview protocols that foster accurate and detailed 
reports from young children (Poole and Lamb, 1998, Wilson and Powell, 2001). 
Knowledge about the factors that impact on preschoolers‟ suggestibility has also 
assisted lawyers and police in making estimations of the risk of error in young 
children‟s accounts (Ceci and Friedman, 2000). 
One limitation of previous work, however, is that interviewers have tended to 
focus entirely on children‟s recall of experienced events. In other words, researchers 
have typically adopted a paradigm where children are exposed to a staged event in 
their school, are subsequently presented with errant details about the event and are 
then asked to recall what happened in the event. The issue of whether young children 
can be led to report non-experienced (i.e., false) events, and how they do so, has 
received little attention among researchers despite its important implications for the 
legal setting. Sometimes debates arise in court as to whether an allegation of abuse by 
a child occurred at all. For example, a lawyer may claim that a child had been coached 
or coerced by a parent into providing an entirely false account of abuse (Gardner, 
1992). An understanding of the nature of children‟s accounts about false events is 
obviously important for determining the feasibility of such claims. If children cannot 
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be led to report false accounts of personal events in laboratory settings, there would 
be no basis to make such a claim in the courtroom.  
One of the first studies to examine preschoolers‟ reports about non-
experienced events was conducted by Ceci et al. (1994). In their study, 48 
preschoolers were asked about four experienced events (i.e., events reported by their 
parents to have occurred such as a birthday party) and four non-experienced events 
(i.e., events confirmed not to have occurred such as falling off a tricycle and getting 
stitches). Each child was initially told that his/her mother had indicated that all the 
events suggested by the interviewer had occurred. Subsequently, once a week for 
eleven weeks, the children were asked to visualise each event, to report whether each 
event had occurred and then to recall everything they could remember about the 
events. The results revealed that while the proportion of children who assented to the 
true events was consistently near ceiling, the percentage of children who assented to 
the false events increased as the interviews progressed (29.5% and 51.0% at the first 
and eleventh interview respectively). In fact, the children‟s narratives for the false 
events became more coherent and detailed as the interviews progressed. In a 
subsequent (twelfth) interview where a new interviewer told the children that some of 
the events previously discussed had never happened, the percentage of children who 
assented remained relatively high (42.5%). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
preschoolers can be led to report that non-experienced events actually happened and 
that this phenomenon probably reflects a combination of both social and memory 
processes. While initially many of the children would have assented to the false event 
to comply with the interviewer, the act of repeatedly visualising and talking about the 
false events may have led to subsequent confusion about whether the details provided 
were actually experienced or merely suggested by the interviewer. This would explain 
 5 
why in the twelfth interview (when social pressure to go along with the suggestions 
was reduced), assent rates remained high. 
In a recent study by Bruck et al. (in press), a more detailed examination of the 
quality and structure of preschoolers‟ narrative accounts of true and false events was 
provided.  Sixteen children were interviewed approximately once a week for five 
weeks about four events; two of the events were true and two were confirmed by the 
parent to be fictional. The events were classified as follows; (i) a true positive event 
where the child helped a lady who had fallen down at the school, (ii) a true negative 
event (supplied by the parent) where the child had been punished for a misdeed, (iii) a 
false positive event where the child supposedly helped a lady find a lost monkey in a 
park, and (iv) a false negative event where the child supposedly witnessed a man steal 
food from the preschool. The first interview was limited to non-suggestive, open-
ended questions, whereas the second and third interviews incorporated a combination 
of powerful suggestive techniques. These techniques included repeated 
misinformation and leading questions (eg., “Was the monkey wearing a collar or a 
leash?”), peer pressure (e.g., “All the other kids told me they helped a lady in the 
park”), guided imagery (i.e., telling the child to pretend or imagine that the event 
happened and to think about the details), and selective reinforcement (e.g., “It‟s so 
wonderful that there are nice kids like you to help people when they need it”). The 
remaining interviews contained no misinformation, but did incorporate the other 
suggestive techniques listed above. 
As expected, most of the children initially denied the two false events. 
However, after only three interviews, the assent rates across all four events were 
similar. Further, while the total details that were reported about each event did not 
tend to change across the interviews, the children‟s narratives for the false events 
were quite rich in detail (in fact they were more detailed than the true events). 
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Overall, the false events included more fantastic and improbable details (e.g., “the 
monkey died”, “Suzanne kicked the bad guy in the legs”), more temporal markers 
(e.g., „then‟, „after‟, „sometimes‟, „usually‟) and more elaborations (e.g., adjectives, 
adverbs and metaphorical terms). Bruck et al. (in press) concluded that these 
qualitative differences in the children‟s reports may have been due to the different 
pools of information that children used to create their reports. For the true events, 
children‟s reports were based on their actual memories of these experiences; a pool of 
knowledge that was obviously limited in terms of content. For the false events, 
however, where there was no original event to draw on other than the interviewer 
suggestions, the children were free to generate (from their imaginations) as many 
details as they wanted. Support for this explanation came from the fact that the true 
narratives were more consistent across the interviews than the false narratives.  
Taken together, the two studies by Ceci and colleagues (summarised above) 
have important applied implications. The work clearly indicates that when an 
interviewer openly states that a false event occurred and provides repeated 
misinformation about that event across interviews, it is possible that preschool 
children can be led to fabricate a convincing account of the event in narrative format. 
This research highlights the dangers of using repeated suggestive questioning with 
young children and highlights how difficult it is to determine the accuracy of young 
children‟s reports about personal events (Poole and Lindsay, 1998). Research in this 
area, however, is still in its infancy and further work is obviously required to 
determine how generalisable these findings are to other types of events, samples and 
interview styles. As Bruck et al. (in press) acknowledged, their interpretations must 
(at present) be confined to the specific situation in which their research was carried 
out. 
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When one considers the procedures and samples used in the prior work by 
Ceci and colleagues, it is feasible that convincing accounts of non-experienced events 
may not be obtained as readily from preschool children using other experimental 
paradigms. First, the designs employed by Bruck et al. (in press) and Ceci et al. 
(1994) involved suggestions being made about entirely false events. In other words, 
the children would have had little pre-existing knowledge about the people or 
contextual details that supposedly occurred in the false event. In contrast, if the 
children were encouraged to describe a false activity that supposedly occurred within 
an event that incorporated existing persons and memories, they may be far less likely 
to be misled than that implied by previous work. The rationale for this proposal is that 
the children‟s existing knowledge about the person or context would help constrain 
them to reality, and may evoke greater confidence in resisting the interviewer 
suggestions (especially if the suggestions are not consistent with children‟s actual 
experiences; see Pezdek and Hodge, 1999). An examination of this issue is important 
because it is sometimes proposed in the field that a false account of abuse is reported 
to have occurred within a sequence of true activities. For example, a lawyer may 
speculate that a child is falsely accusing her father of abuse, which is reported to have 
occurred during one of her regular access visits with her father. 
Second, the majority of participants in prior research were from low socio-
economic status (SES) backgrounds.  In particular, 75% of the participants in the 
study reported by Ceci et al. (1994) and most of the children (the precise number was 
unspecified) recruited by Bruck et al. (in press) came from working-class families or 
those receiving public assistance. As McFarlane et al. (in press) showed, SES is a 
significant predictor of preschoolers‟ suggestibility (over and above IQ) with children 
from high SES backgrounds being more resistant to interviewer suggestion than 
children of low SES backgrounds. They concluded that this may be due to the more 
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elaborative conversation style that high SES parents typically use with their children 
(compared to low SES parents): Elaborative conversation facilitates the development 
of cognitive competencies in children (Leseman and Sijsling, 1996) as well as 
children‟s autobiographical memory abilities (Reese et al., 1993).  
Third, the previous work by Ceci and colleagues (Ceci et al., 1994; Bruck et 
al., in press) adopted a combination of potent suggestive techniques, including two of 
the most highly suggestive techniques identified in previous research. These include 
repeated misinformation (by the same interviewer) across multiple interviews and a 
technique called „guided imagery‟ which requires children to think about and create 
mental images of an event. We know that preschoolers are especially susceptible to 
source misattributions when they are repeatedly encouraged to think about or 
visualize details that never occurred. In other words, they can mistake the familiarity 
of imagined events or events suggested by an interviewer for events that actually 
occurred (Foley et al., 1989, see also Roberts & Blades, 2000). This is particularly the 
case when misinformation, and subsequent questioning about the event, take place a 
while after, rather than shortly after the event (Holliday et al., 1999; Marche, 1999; 
Pezdek and Roe, 1995; Warren and Lane, 1995). From an applied perspective, 
therefore, it would be useful to determine whether the previous findings of Ceci and 
colleagues generalise to situations where misinformation and subsequent retrieval 
tests occur relatively soon after the event, where misinformation is not repeated across 
the interviews, and where guided imagery is not used. Indeed, guided imagery is less 
likely to be used by investigative interviewers in the field compared to other 
techniques (e.g., leading questions, selective reinforcement and peer pressure; Ceci 
and Bruck, 1995).  
Finally, the events that were assigned to false and true status in the previous 
work were not counterbalanced because it is not possible for experimenters to have 
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any control over naturally occurring events (e.g., those provided by parents). The lack 
of counterbalancing makes it difficult to determine with certainty the degree to which 
the findings are attributable to the nature of the events classified as true or false, or to 
the children‟s actual experiences. In fact, Bruck et al‟s (in press) findings could be 
due in part to the type of false events chosen. They incorporated highly emotive 
events, and the true and false events used in their study were very different in terms of 
their likelihood of occurrence and the degree of prior knowledge the children could 
have drawn on. For example, it is unlikely that a child would have helped a lady find 
a monkey in a park before (the false event), but they were likely to have helped 
someone who had fallen over at their kindergarten (the true event). 
The aim of the current study was to replicate and extend the findings of Ceci 
and colleagues while addressing the above-mentioned issues regarding their 
procedures. Specifically, four major modifications to the previous research designs 
were made in this study; modifications that were expected to minimise suggestibility 
effects for the false event. First, across three separate interviews, the children were 
required to report what had happened in two experienced activities as well as a non-
experienced (false) activity that was suggested to have occurred along with the two 
activities. In this sense, the study elicited recall of a false activity that was embedded 
within an experienced event (as opposed to an entirely false event), and recall of the 
false activity was compared to both a true-unbiased as well as a true-biased activity.  
Second, a large sample of preschoolers was included from both high and low SES 
backgrounds so that the precise impact of SES on children‟s narrative accounts of true 
and false activities could be examined. Third, the activities assigned to false and true 
status were counterbalanced, and fourth, while a suggestive paradigm was used, the 
interviewer only provided misinformation during the first interview (which was held 
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relatively soon after the event) and did not explicitly ask the children to imagine or 
visualise any of the activities.  
Overall it was expected that in each interview, the children would be less 
likely to assent to the false activity compared to the true-biased and true-unbiased 
activities. Further, accounts of the false activity (if provided) would be less detailed 
and elaborate than accounts of the two true activities, and there would be little change 
in the quality and quantity of information reported about the false activity across the 
three interviews. In other words, we anticipated that the children would be quite 
resistant to interviewer suggestions about the false activity given that they had pre-
existing memories related to the event and that the false suggested activity was not 
consistent with the activities they had experienced. The distinction between the true 
and false narratives, however, was expected to be most evident for the children from 
the high SES than the low SES backgrounds, as previous research indicates that SES 
has a strong negative relationship with suggestibility in this age group (McFarlane et 
al., in press). 
Method 
Design 
Children participated in an event that consisted of two activities. Either one or two 
days after the event, the children were asked to describe each of the activities in their own 
words as well as an activity they had not experienced in the event (hereby referred to as 
the false activity). The children were then given a biasing interview that included 
questions about one of the two experienced activities (hereby referred to as the true-biased 
activity), and the false activity. For the true-biased activity, half of the questions suggested 
details that had occurred in the event (hereby referred to as true suggestions) and half of 
the questions suggested details that had not occurred in the event (hereby referred to as 
false suggestions). For the false activity, all the questions were obviously false 
suggestions. For the remaining experienced activity (hereby referred to as the true-
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unbiased activity), no questions were asked in the biasing interview. Three and eight days 
after the activities were presented, the children were encouraged to recall in their own 
words what happened in each of the activities. 
Participants 
One hundred and six children (58 males, 48 females) aged 4 to 5 years 
participated in the study (M age = 4 years, 8 months; SD = 4.17 months, age range = 4 
years, 0 months to 5 years, 7 months).
1
 Children were recruited from eight 
kindergartens in the Melbourne metropolitan area. Four of the kindergartens were 
classified as representing high SES families (these kindergartens demanded very high 
fees and were attached to reputable private elementary schools). The remaining 
kindergartens were based in low SES areas according to ratings provided by the 
Department of Human Services. All children who were granted parental consent to 
participate were included in the study provided they had no significant language or 
learning difficulties (as determined by the regular teacher). 
Materials 
Each activity consisted of 10 critical items that were administered in the same 
temporal order. Table 1 presents the three activities and the critical items that were 
associated with each activity. Note that an attempt was made to match each activity in 
terms of the number, variety and plausibility of items. An additional attempt to control for 
item effects involved varying the particular activities that represented the true-unbiased, 
true-biased and false activity among the children. Three possible combinations of the three 
activities were created and an equal number of children were assigned to each 
combination. Therefore, any difference in memory performance across the activities (true-
unbiased, true-biased and false) cannot be attributed to differences in the characteristics or 
saliency of items that made up the activity and the order in which they were presented.  
                                                 
1 Previous research by Ceci and colleagues used a similar age group, therefore the results of the present 
study are directly comparable to the previous work.  
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________________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
________________ 
 
Among the children, each item in Table 1 was an experienced versus false 
suggested item an equal number of times. For instance, half of the children whose true-
biased activity was the story experienced Version A items, and Version B items made up 
the false suggestions in the biasing interview. The other half of the children experienced 
Version B items and Version A items were selected as the false suggestions in the biasing 
interview. For the true-unbiased activity, half of the children experienced Version A items, 
while the remainder experienced Version B items. For the false activity, half of the 
children received Version A items as the false suggested items, while the remaining half 
received Version B items as the false suggested items. Note that not all of the items listed 
in Table 1 represented true and false suggestions. For half of each of the sub-groups, the 
true and false suggestions were the even numbered items in Table 1, whereas for the other 
half, the true and false suggested items were the odd numbered items. The order in which 
the activities were talked about during the interviews was also counterbalanced among the 
children.  
Procedure 
The event. The event (referred to as the “Deakin Activities”) was administered 
by a research assistant in the children‟s classroom with the assistance of the regular 
teacher. When introducing the event, the assistant explained, “I‟ve called it the 
Deakin Activities because some people at a place called Deakin University helped me 
to get to all the things ready for what we are going to do today”. The event took 
approximately 25 minutes to administer and consisted of two of the three scripted  
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activities listed in Table 1, assigned in accordance with the counterbalancing 
procedure described earlier. Possible activities included hearing a story about an 
elephant, interacting with a koala puppet and selecting a surprise sticker. While these 
are not unusual activities for preschoolers, the materials and scripts were developed 
solely for this research and hence the children would not have had contact with them 
before. Teachers were instructed not to discuss the activities or to inform the children 
that they would later be interviewed about the activities.  
The interviews. Each child individually attended three interview sessions held 
1-2, 3 and 8 days after the event. Each interview took approximately 10-15 minutes to 
complete, was conducted by the same person (who was different to the person who 
conducted the event) and involved the elicitation of a narrative account of each of the 
activities. Specifically, the interviewer began, “I heard that you did three things in the 
Deakin Activities. You got a story about an elephant that wanted to get married, you 
met the special friend the koala, and you got a surprise sticker.” The children were 
then asked to relate in their own words everything they could remember about each 
activity from the very beginning. General prompts were given such as “What else 
happened?, “What happened next?” In addition, suggestive techniques were used as 
encouragers. These included peer conformity (e.g., "Some other children told me that 
you met the special friend the koala."), positive reinforcement (e.g., "You're doing so 
well at answering my questions."), negative reinforcement (e.g., "That's a shame you 
can't remember, because I really need to know what happened."), and appeal (e.g., "I 
really need your help answering these questions"). 
The only interview that involved a variation to the above mentioned procedure was 
the first interview. In this interview, a series of 17 specific questions was asked at the end 
of the children‟s narrative accounts in order to present false information about two of the 
activities. These questions were asked in the same order for each child. Ten of the 
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questions related to the true-biased activity. Half of these questions suggested false details 
about the activity and half suggested true details in accordance with the counterbalancing 
procedure described earlier. For example, if the child had met Boo the koala in the event, 
the corresponding false suggestion would have been “I heard you met a koala in the 
Deakin activities. Tell me what Kip the koala looked like?” A corresponding true 
suggestion would have been “Tell me what Boo the koala looked like?” Presuppositional 
questions of this nature have successfully been used to show reliable suggestibility effects 
using a similar event (e.g., Powell et al., 1999). For half of each of the subgroups, the true 
suggestions were the even numbered items in Table 1, whereas for the other half, the true 
suggestions were the odd numbered items. 
The remaining seven questions corresponded to the false (non-experienced) 
activity. Five of these questions suggested false details about the activity. For example, if 
the false activity was the elephant story, the children may have been asked, “I heard the 
elephant got married in a hot air balloon. That‟s a funny place to get married. Did any of 
his friends come to the wedding?” The remaining two of the questions were general 
questions about the event (i.e., “What did you sit on during the Deakin Activities?”, or 
“What was on your special badge that you wore in the Deakin Activities?”). These two 
filler questions were interspersed among the other five misleading questions so that the 
children could answer both true and false questions in association with the false activity.  
Coding 
The children‟s responses were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim for coding. 
The coding procedure for each interview was the same (note that the specific 
questions in Interview 1 were not coded, as their purpose was merely to provide 
biasing information). 
Assents. It was firstly determined whether or not the children had assented to 
each of the activities in response to the open-ended questions. A child was judged to 
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have assented to an activity if (s)he provided information about the activity as if it had 
happened. 
Accuracy of narrative details provided. When a child assented to an activity, 
each detail they provided in their narrative description of the activity was coded as 
correct or incorrect. When a detail was incorrect, it was assigned to one of the 
following error categories; (i) Interviewer suggestion when the child restated an 
inaccurate detail that was previously provided by the interviewer in the first interview, 
(ii) Brought from another activity when the child‟s answer referred to a detail that was 
experienced in another (true) activity (e.g., stating that the koala puppet got married 
when it was the elephant in the story that got married), (iii) Confabulations when the 
child provided a detail that was not mentioned by the interviewer and was not 
included in any of the Deakin Activities (eg., stating there was a monkey swinging 
from trees in the elephant story), and (iv) Confusion about aspects of an activity when 
the child confused aspects from within an experienced activity (e.g., stating that the 
elephant‟s wife put out the fire in the story when it was really the elephant). 
 Nature of details reported. Correct and incorrect details were classified (where 
appropriate) as actions, objects, or subjects. For example, if a child said "the koala fell 
off a house and broke his leg" when the koala fell off the tree and broke his arm, one 
score was assigned for each of the following details; the correct subject koala, the 
correct action fell off, the incorrect object house, the correct action broke, the correct 
subject his and the incorrect object leg. In addition, correct and incorrect elaborative 
details were coded and were divided into the following categories; (i) temporal 
markers which included words referring to chronological time (e.g., then, after, first, 
next, last), causal relations (e.g., because, so, in order to) and optional states (e.g., 
sometimes, usually, always, or, probably), (ii) descriptive information which included 
adjectives or adverbs used to describe actions, objects and subjects (e.g., „we ran fast‟, 
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„blue sticker‟), (iii) dialogue statements which included any reference to dialogue 
(eg., "she said..."), (iv) references to location (e.g., on, under, in, inside, where) and 
(v) fantastic/improbable details which included any details that were outlandish or 
implausible (eg., “The whale was down the drainpipe”) or contained one of the 
following aggressive themes: hurting or being hurt, and breaking things (e.g., “The 
koala smashed through windows”). Note that fantastic/improbable details could not be 
coded as correct or incorrect. A final category of detail coded in this study included 
(vi) contradictions which referred to details mentioned in the third interview that 
contradicted details mentioned in the second interview (e.g., where a child reports in 
the second interview that “the elephant married the hippopotamus” and in the third 
interview reports that “the elephant married the crocodile”). 
All transcripts were coded by one researcher and 10% of these were also 
coded by a second researcher who was not otherwise involved in the study. Interrater 
reliability calculated as agreements/ (agreements + disagreements) was 100 % for 
assents and 89% for the narrative details provided in free recall. Discrepancies were 
resolved and the codes assigned by the principal coder were used in all analyses.  
Results 
 All the analyses reported in this paper were initially performed with gender of 
child included as a between-subjects factor. There were no effects of gender, therefore 
(for ease of presentation) all subsequent analyses have been reported collapsed over 
this factor. Given the number of analyses performed, the more conservative p value of 
.01 was used for the omnibus analyses (p value for planned comparisons is .05). 
Assents. Table 2 displays the percentage of children who assented to each 
activity across the two SES groups. As can be seen in this table, the pattern of results 
differed according to whether the children had experienced the activities. For each 
SES group and for each of the experienced (true) activities, the proportion of children 
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who assented to the activities in the first interview was near ceiling and remained 
relatively stable across the remaining interviews. This was supported by a series of chi 
square analyses which revealed no change in assent rates across the interviews for the 
true-unbiased (high SES = 2 (2) = 0.20, p = .91, low SES = 2 (2) = 0.36, p = .84) or 
the true-biased activity, (high SES = 2 (2) = 0.21, p = .90, low SES = 2 (2) = 0.14, p 
= .93). For the non-experienced (false) activity, however, the percentage of children 
who assented tended to increase from the first to the second interview, although for 
the low SES group this change did not reach significance (high SES  = 2 (2) = 8.71, 
p = .01, low SES = 2 (2) = 5.10, p = .078. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
_______________ 
Next, chi-square tests were performed to determine if assent rates differed across 
the activities at each interview. For the high SES children, there was a significant 
difference in assent rates between the activities at the first, 2 (2) = 38.35, p < .001, 
second, 2 (2) = 15.23, p < .001, and third, 2 (2) = 11.46, p < .01, interviews. 
Comparisons for pairs of activities at each interview consistently revealed no difference 
in the percentage of assents for the two true activities, however children were less likely 
to assent to the false activity compared to the true-unbiased activity and true-biased 
activity. For the low SES children, there was a significant difference in assent rates 
between the activities at the first interview, 2 (2) = 16.94, p < .001, which was consistent 
with the pattern reported above for the high SES children. However, there was no 
difference in assent rates between the activities for the second, 2 (2) = 3.84, p = .15, and 
third, 2 (2) = 2.07, p = .36, interviews.  
The amount of information reported 
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 Table 3 presents the mean total details reported across each activity, SES 
group and interview. To explore whether the amount of information reported about 
the false activity differed to that of the true activities, a 3 (activity; true-unbiased, 
true-biased, false) x 2 (interview; second, third) x 2 (SES; low, high) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed on the total number of details reported
2
. 
Responses for the first interview were not examined because assent rates for the false 
activity in this interview were relatively low (particularly for the high SES children) 
and because biasing information had not yet been provided. In other words, a 
comparison of reports about the true-biased and false activity was not meaningful 
until after biasing information had been provided. In cases where a child did not 
assent to an activity, the group mean for that activity at the relevant interview was 
substituted
3
.   _______________ 
Insert Table 3 here 
_______________ 
The results revealed a main effect of activity, F(2, 208) = 10.28, p < .001, 
which was modified by an interaction between activity and interview, F(2, 208) = 
10.72, p < .001. In the second interview, there was a main effect of activity, F(2, 210) 
= 16.79, p < .001. Children reported more information about the true-unbiased (M = 
14.71, SD = 11.74) than the false activity (M = 8.11, SD = 5.84), t(105) = -6.01, p < 
.001, and more information about the true-biased (M = 13.97, SD = 10.32) than the 
false activity, t(105) = -5.35, p < .001, however, the amount of information children 
                                                 
2 Accuracy was not examined, because correct information cannot be provided about the false event (a 
comparison of the false and true events was the focus of this study).  Total details included everything 
the child mentioned except fantastic/improbable details and contradictions, which contained 
information that had already been coded under other categories.  
 
3 This is a conservative (estimated) analysis because the mean of the distribution does not change 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  A less conservative (non-estimated) method of dealing with the 
children who did not assent was also employed; a score of „0‟ was assigned to missing cells. However, 
this revealed a similar pattern of results as for the conservative method, therefore the results of the 
conservative analyses are reported in the text and tables. 
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reported in the true-unbiased and true-biased activities did not differ, t(105) = 0.49, p 
< .62. In the third interview, there was no difference in the amount of information 
children provided across the three activities, F(2, 210) = 1.00, p = .37. 
Nature of information reported 
Table 4 presents the mean number of details reported (irrespective of 
accuracy) for each separate sentence-unit (i.e., subjects, objects, actions, temporal 
details, descriptives, dialogue, locations, fantastic/improbable details and 
contradictions). A series of 3 (activity; true-unbiased, true-biased, false) x 2 
(interview; second, third) x 2 (SES; low, high) ANOVAs was performed on each of 
these categories except contradictions. Because the mean number of contradictions 
was consistently near floor, no analysis was performed on these responses. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 4 here 
_______________ 
 There was a main effect of activity for each of the sentence-units, except for 
locations. Specifically, there were more references to subjects, F(2, 208) = 5.39, p = 
.01, objects, F(2, 208) = 8.50, p < .001, actions, F(2, 208) = 5.53, p = .01, 
descriptives, F(2, 208) = 5.97, p = .003, temporal markers, F(2, 208) = 6.85, p = .001, 
and dialogue statements, F(2, 208) = 8.61, p < .001, for the true-unbiased and true-
biased activities than for the false activities. The only deviation to this pattern 
occurred for the fantastical/improbable details were a higher number of these details 
were reported for the false activity (M = 0.55, SD = 1.23) than the true-unbiased 
activity (M = 0.33, SD = 1.05) and true-biased activity (M = 0.30, SD = 1.10). The 
only other findings were significant interactions between activity and interview for 
actions, F(2, 208) = 9.18, p < .001 and subjects, F(2, 208) = 16.63, p < .001. For the 
true-unbiased and true-biased activities there were more references to actions and 
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subjects in interview 2 than in interview 3. For the false activity, however, there were 
more references to actions and subjects in interview 3 than in interview 2. 
It is important to note, however, that while there were few interactions 
involving interview, the patterns of findings in Table 4 suggest that the number of 
sentence units for the true activities tended to decline from the second to the third 
interviews whereas for the false activity, they tended to increase. In other words, the 
reporting of the various units of information became more similar between the false 
activity and the true activities as the interviews progressed. Another way of measuring 
this is to calculate the difference in sentence units reported between each of the true 
activities and the false activity. This was calculated by subtracting the number of 
details reported for the false activity from the number of details reported for each of 
the true activities; the mean difference scores are presented in Table 5. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 5 here 
_______________ 
For most of the sentence-units except for dialogue statements and 
fantastic/improbable details, there was a main effect of interview. Specifically, for the 
subjects, F(1, 104) = 33.95, p < .001, objects, F(1, 104) = 11.42, p < .001, actions, 
F(1, 104) = 22.61, p < .001, locations, F(1, 104) = 9.69, p = .002, descriptives, F(1, 
104) = 10.30, p = .002, and temporal markers, F(1, 104) = 5.84, p = .02, the difference 
in the amount of information reported across the activities was smaller in the third 
interview compared to the second interview. The only other finding revealed for any 
of these analyses was a main effect of SES, F(1, 104) = 9.86, p = .002, for the mean 
number of descriptives. The differences in the mean number of descriptive 
information across the activities was greater for the children from high SES (M = 
4.15, SD = 6.61) than low SES backgrounds (M = .33, SD = .51).  
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The types of errors reported  
As described in the coding section, four types of errors were reported by the 
children. These included (i) details brought from another (experienced) activity, (ii) 
details that were not mentioned by the interviewer and were not included in any of the 
Deakin Activities (referred to as confabulation errors), (iii) details that reflected a 
confusion of aspects from within an activity, and (iv) details previously suggested by 
the interviewer. Table 6 displays the proportion of errors that were made in each of 
the above categories) across the interviews, activities and SES groups. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 6 here 
_______________ 
 
As can be seen in Table 6, there was relatively little confusion about details 
from within an activity for the two true activities, and for all three of the activities, the 
majority of errors reported by the children were confabulations. In relation to the 
confabulation errors, a 3 (activity; true-unbiased, true-biased, false) x 2 (interview; 
second, third) x 2 (SES; low, high) revealed one effect; a main effect of activity, F(2, 
208) = 12.36, p < .001. There was a lower proportion of confabulation errors for the 
false activity (M = 0.45, SD = 0.27) compared to the two true activities, and the rate 
of these errors was comparable for the true-unbiased (M = 0.56, SD, = 0.33) and true-
biased (M = 0.61, SD, = 0.31) activities. Regarding the errors that were brought from 
another activity, there was also main effect of activity, F(2, 208) = 4.81, p < .01. 
While the proportion of these errors for the true-biased activity (M = 0.24, SD = 0.26) 
and the false activity (M = 0.31, SD = 0.28) were both lower compared to the true-
unbiased activity (M = 0.40, SD = 0.32), there was no difference between the true-
biased and the false activities. The only other effect involving errors that were brought 
from another activity was a significant interaction involving activity and SES, F(2, 
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208) = 6.77, p < .01. When SES was analysed separately for each activity, there was 
no difference in error rates between the low and high SES groups for the true-
unbiased activity and true-biased activities. However, there was a main effect of SES 
for the false activity, F(1, 105) = 9.15, p < .01; for children in the low SES group, 
intrusions of details from another activity were higher (M = 0.39, SD = 0.34) than for 
the children in the high SES group (M = 0.23, SD = 0.15). 
Finally, a 2 (activity; true-biased, false) x 2 (interview; second, third) ANOVA 
was performed on the proportion of responses where the child had repeated a false 
interviewer suggestion. This revealed a main effect of activity, F(1, 104) = 48.00, p < 
.001, which indicated that more of these errors were included in reports about the 
false activity (M = 0.19, SD = 0.22) than the true-biased activity (M = 0.05, SD = 
0.14). 
Discussion 
 Previous research by Ceci and colleagues (Bruck et al., in press; Ceci et al., 
1994) has shown that after only a few suggestive interviews, preschoolers can be led 
to report accounts of false (non-experienced) events that are similar in content and 
structure to their narratives about true (experienced) events. The current study 
examined the generalisability of this conclusion while altering the research design of 
the previous work in several major ways that would minimise suggestibility effects 
for the false event. While we initially predicted that these changes would make the 
children quite resistant to suggestions about the false event, our results revealed that 
the central findings reported by Ceci and colleagues did generalise to the current 
design. Each of the current results are discussed in turn while drawing comparisons 
(where applicable) with the findings of previous work. 
First, analyses were performed comparing assent rates to three activities (a 
true-unbiased, true-biased and false activity) across three interviews. While assent to 
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the two true activities was consistently near ceiling across the interviews and was 
higher than that for the false activity at the first interview, the assent rates across the 
true and false activities became more similar after the first (biasing) interview. In fact 
for the low SES group, assent rates for the true and false activities was not 
significantly different by the third interview; a finding consistent with that reported by 
Bruck et al. (in press)
4
. Given the nature of our design and procedure, one can 
conclude that the findings of Bruck et al. (in press) were not specific to the context or 
nature of the events assigned to true and false status, the timing of the interviews, or 
to the particularly potent suggestibility paradigm adopted in their study (i.e., the use 
of imagery and repeated misinformation). However, it is possible that the degree to 
which the children acquiesced to the false events in Bruck et al‟s work may have been 
reduced somewhat if a larger proportion of children from high SES backgrounds had 
been included in their study. 
 Second, like Bruck et al. (in press), we analysed the amount of detail reported 
across activities in total and separately for each of the various units of information 
(i.e., subjects, objects, actions, temporal markers, descriptive details, locations, 
fantastic/improbable details and contradictions). The results in these areas also 
support previous claims that after a few interviews, children‟s narratives about a false 
activity become more similar in detail, structure and quality to their narratives about 
true activities. Indeed, by the third interview, the total number of details reported in 
our study and the number of contradictions was no different across activities, and 
differences in the number of individual sentence units reported across the false and 
true activities was significantly reduced compared to the second interview. In other 
words, the narratives about the false activity became more elaborate as the interviews 
progressed, while the narratives about the true activities tended to become less so. 
                                                 
4 Ceci et al. (1994) did not compare assent rates across the false and true events. 
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Interestingly, Bruck et al. (in press) showed that the rate of 
fantastic/improbable details was higher for a false event compared to a true event. 
This pattern was also supported in our study 
5
. However, the fact that all the true 
activities in our study were staged in the children‟s preschool permitted us to examine 
a wider range of errors compared to previous work. Consideration of these patterns of 
errors allowed us to speculate further about the conclusions drawn by Bruck et al. 
regarding the reason for the higher rate of fantastic/improbable details for the false 
event. In particular, Bruck et al. proposed that this was because children‟s reports of 
the true events were based on their memories of these experiences; a pool of 
knowledge that was „somewhat constrained by their actual experiences‟ (p 32). For 
the false events, however, where there was no original event to draw on other than the 
interviewer suggestions, the children were free to generate from their imaginations as 
many details as they wanted and to creatively use the misinformation to construct 
elaborate false reports.  
This interpretation offered by Bruck et al. (in press) for the higher incidence of 
fantastic/improbable details is only partially consistent with the pattern of errors 
observed in our study. If the children had a tendency to draw from their imaginations 
when constructing the false activity in our study, one would expect the rate of 
confabulation errors (i.e., details not mentioned by the interviewer nor included in the 
event) to be higher for the false activity compared to the true activity. While 
confabulation errors were the most frequent error reported across all the activities, the 
incidence of these errors was actually lower for the false compared to the true 
activities. Further, unlike Bruck et al‟s work where there was no difference in the rate 
of incorporation of interviewer suggestions for true and false narratives
6
, our study 
                                                 
5 The number of these errors did seem higher (M = 1.85) in Bruck et al.‟s work than that in our study 
(M = .55). 
 
6 The exception to this was at interview 4 where the incorporation rate was higher for the false 
negative event than the other events. 
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showed a greater tendency for children to rely on interviewer suggestions when 
recalling the false activity and they were just as likely to draw from their actual 
experiences (i.e., the other activities that occurred in the event) when recalling the 
false activity compared to the true-biased activity. These findings suggest that when 
children report about a false event or activity, they tend to draw from numerous 
sources of information available to them at the time of retrieval. These sources can 
include existing knowledge about the event or similar events, interviewer or other 
suggestions, as well as their imaginations. The rate at which they draw on their 
imagination would depend on the degree to which other information is available to 
them. In our design, the children would have had more pre-existing knowledge about 
the event to draw on than in Bruck‟s work because the false activity was suggested to 
have occurred within an experienced event involving two activities that were well 
remembered. Contrary to our initial prediction, this might have reduced the degree to 
which they relied on their imagination and may have increased the feasibility of (and 
subsequent compliance to) interviewer suggestions about the false activity.  
Overall, the findings of this study provide incentive for further research to 
explore how the nature of the events and interviewer instructions influences the 
pattern of errors and the nature of children‟s narratives about true versus false 
activities or events. For example, does reliance on interviewer suggestion when 
recalling a false activity increase when the interviewer provides some correct 
suggestions about the event (as was the case in our study)? Does the rate of 
fantastic/improbable details depend on how emotive or plausible the event/activity is? 
Would the provision of clear groundrules (e.g., instructions not to guess or make up 
responses) change the nature and structure of children‟s narratives about false events? 
What is the independent contribution of each suggestive technique used in this study 
(e.g., would repeated nonbiased interviews have still led to convincing false 
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narratives)? Given the important practical implications of each of these questions, and 
the paucity of existing research comparing preschoolers‟ recall of experienced versus 
non-experienced events across multiple interviews, further research in this area is 
clearly warranted. 
 One final issue examined in this study was the impact of socio-economic 
status (SES) on the children‟s suggestibility. Two extreme groups of SES (based 
predominantly on parental income) were included as a between-subjects variable in 
this study. Given that previous work involving a similar event and sample has shown 
a strong negative relationship with suggestibility (McFarlane et al., in press), we 
suspected that this factor may markedly influence the nature of the false reports, 
assent rates and pattern of errors across the interviews and activities. Overall, while 
the difference in assent rates for the false versus true activities was greater at the 
second and third interviews for the high than the low SES group, SES had little effect 
on the nature and quality of information reported about the false activity. In particular, 
the mean number of descriptive details reported across the activities was greater for 
the high than the low SES group, and the rate of errors that were brought from another 
activity was higher among the low SES group when reporting the false activity. In 
other words, while children from high SES backgrounds may be more resistant to 
interviewer suggestion than children from low SES backgrounds, when they do assent 
to a false activity, their narrative reports are highly similar in content and structure to 
those of low SES children. 
 In summary, the findings of this study provide support for the conclusion that 
after repeated coercive interviews and the provision of false interviewer suggestions, 
preschool children can be led to provide narrative reports of false (non-experienced) 
activities that are similar in quality and structure to their reports of true activities. 
While this study did not include the use of imagery (instructions to pretend or 
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imagine) or repeated misinformation, the combination of suggestive techniques used 
(i.e., peer conformity, positive/negative reinforcement and appeal) were sufficient to 
produce results consistent with that of Ceci and colleagues previous work (Bruck et 
al., in press; Ceci et al., 1994). This finding highlights the danger of using suggestive 
and coercive techniques with this age group and reiterates the importance of 
encouraging investigative interviewers to avoid these techniques in their practice. 
Further, the work highlights the danger of basing judgements about the credibility of 
children‟s responses about events or activities on the quality, structure and nature of 
their reports. Indeed, this study (as with previous work) has provided no basis for 
distinguishing between activities that were experienced and those that were not 
experienced. Although mean differences in certain details were sometimes revealed 
across the activities (e.g., fantastical/improbable features were more often present in 
the false reports), the fact that these details were also present in the true reports, and 
that several false reports were devoid of such details, renders them useless in 
diagnosing the accuracy of an account per se. Given the practical implications of these 
findings and the paucity of existing research on the topic, further work incorporating a 
wider range of child samples and research designs is warranted to ascertain the 
precise conditions in which elaborate reports of false events occur. 
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Table 1. 
Full set of activities and associated target items for the event. 
 
                                                                                                         Version of Items                                                    
Activity  Item A B 
     
Story 1 Name of the elephant peter John 
 2 Elephant‟s home jungle  Zoo 
 3 Animal the elephant marries hippopotamus Giraffe 
 4 Where they marry hot air balloon Pool 
 5 Where elephant gets a job supermarket Hairdresser 
 6 What job he gets fireman Astronaut 
 7 Where the story came from rubbish bin Present 
 8 Where elephant went on holiday Disneyland Olympics 
 9 How the pictures were held up book Sticks 
 10 Who held the pictures child A child B 
     
Puppet 1 Name of the koala Boo Kip 
 2 Where found box Handbag 
 3 Where RA met the koala park Handbag 
 4 Where the koala sleeps under the bed dog kennel 
 5 Age of the koala one year two years 
 6 Koala‟s best friend kookaburra Kangaroo 
 7 Why the koala was sick broken arm Cold 
 8 How Koala kept warm jumper Newspaper 
 9 Koala‟s dinner soup Spaghetti 
 10 Purpose of Koala‟s stick to cook dig for worms 
     
Surprise 1 Container for stickers lunchbox Jar 
 2 Colour of sticker yellow Blue 
 3 Theme of sticker dinosaur Dolphin 
 4 RA‟s surprise scarf Gloves 
 5 Where the stickers were hidden cupboard Bookshelf 
 6 First child to get a sticker child A child B 
 7 Exercise while waiting for sticker jump 10 times clap 10 times 
 8 Word to say when collect sticker hello Name 
 9 Where stickers were placed child‟s hand child‟s chest 
 10 Person to receive remaining stickers RA‟s brother RA‟s sister 
 
NB: RA refers to the person who administered the event.
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Table 2.  
Percentage of children who assented to each activity, SES group and interview. 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Activity    Interview order 
    First   Second  Third 
_______________________________________________________________ 
True-Unbiased  
 High SES    96   98   92 
 Low SES    96   91   88 
True-Biased  
 High SES    90   86   92 
 Low SES    91   93   88 
False   
 High SES    29   51   55 
 Low SES    49   70   72 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Note: N = 106 
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Table 3.  
Mean total details reported across each activity, SES group and interview. 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
Activity  Total details
a
  
______________________________________________________________ 
  Second interview Third interview 
True-Unbiased 
 High SES (N = 49)  15.12 (14.22)   13.61 (10.34) 
 Low SES (N = 57)  14.36 (9.20)   11.10 (6.87) 
True-Biased 
 High SES (N = 49)  15.18 (10.51)  12.34 (8.74) 
 Low SES (N = 57)  12.93 (10.13)  10.55 (9.03) 
False 
 High SES (N = 49)   9.12 (7.24)   11.88 (8.75) 
 Low SES (N = 57)   7.24 (4.17)  10.00 (7.09) 
____________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. 
a
 Total details excludes 
fantastic/improbable details and contradictions which contained information that had 
already been coded under other categories. 
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Table 4.  
Mean number of details reported for each unit of information.  
 
Detail Second interview Third interview 
 High SES Low SES High SES Low SES 
True-unbiased     
     Subjects 3.06 (3.01) 3.24 (2.13) 2.89 (2.57) 2.41 (1.63) 
     Objects 2.89 (3.06) 2.81 (2.18) 2.49 (2.09) 2.52 (2.15) 
     Actions 4.75 (4.68) 4.73 (3.27) 4.18 (3.39) 3.35 (2.22) 
     Temporal markers 1.12 (1.51) 0.93 (0.94) 0.96 (1.42) 0.66 (0.92) 
     Descriptives 2.20 (2.51) 1.57 (1.38) 2.00 (2.23) 1.14 (0.99) 
     Dialogue 0.27 (0.60) 0.18 (0.41) 0.22 (0.54) 0.22 (0.54) 
     Locations 0.81 (1.01) 0.90 (1.00) 0.88 (0.94) 0.80 (0.95) 
     Fantastic/improbable  0.04 (0.20) 0.30 (0.75) 0.09 (0.28) 0.19 (0.76) 
     Contradictionsa _________ _________ 0.13 (0.33) 0.12 (0.31) 
True-biased     
     Subjects 3.32 (2.16) 2.61 (1.96) 2.35 (2.31) 2.46 (2.08) 
     Objects 2.68 (2.41) 2.77 (3.00) 2.43 (2.43) 2.10 (2.50) 
     Actions 4.85 (4.03) 4.19 (3.54) 3.78 (3.01) 3.23 (2.67) 
     Temporal markers 1.01 (1.24) 0.62 (0.83) 0.64 (0.82) 0.74 (1.15) 
     Descriptives 2.37 (2.61) 1.67 (2.04) 2.21 (2.77) 1.17 (1.52) 
     Dialogue 0.18 (0.42) 0.10 (0.28) 0.18 (0.37) 0.10 (0.28) 
     Locations 0.78 (0.81) 0.97 (1.08) 0.75 (0.74) 0.75 (0.88) 
     Fantastic/ improbable  0.13 (0.37) 0.20 (0.89) 0.03 (0.15) 0.21 (0.72) 
     Contradictions _________ _________ 0.07 (0.24) 0.04 (0.19) 
False     
     Subjects 2.07 (1.51) 1.36 (1.00) 2.87 (1.95) 2.48 (2.26) 
     Objects 1.64 (1.36) 1.40 (1.56) 2.34 (2.16) 1.58 (1.44) 
     Actions 3.32 (2.99) 2.32 (1.51) 3.87 (3.10) 3.24 (2.95) 
     Temporal markers 0.54 (1.02) 0.42 (0.70) 0.66 (0.73) 0.49 (0.57) 
     Descriptives 1.02 (0.97) 1.15 (1.29) 1.29 (1.41) 1.46 (1.59) 
     Dialogue 0.08 (0.20) 0.08 (0.40) 0.06 (0.20) 0.03 (0.13) 
     Locations 0.44 (0.50) 0.51 (0.65) 0.79 (0.68) 0.72 (0.79) 
     Fantastic/ improbable  0.33 (0.86) 0.35 (1.02) 0.11 (0.47) 0.29 (0.88) 
     Contradictions _________ _________ 0.04 (0.14) 0.05 (0.18) 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
a 
Contradictions refers to details 
mentioned in the third interview that contradicted details in the second interview.
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Table 5.  
Mean difference scores reported for each of the individual units of information. 
 
Detail Second interview Third interview 
 High SES Low SES High SES Low SES 
TRUE-UNBIASED VS FALSE ACTIVITIES 
     Subjects  0.99 (2.87)  1.88 (2.09)  0.02 (2.57) -0.07 (2.57) 
     Objects  1.26 (2.90)  1.41 (2.58)  0.15 (2.54)  0.94 (2.45) 
     Actions  1.43 (4.72)  2.41 (3.23) -0.09 (4.57) -0.01 (2.66) 
     Temporal markers  0.58 (1.88)  0.51 (1.12)  0.30 (1.23)  0.17 (0.94) 
     Descriptives  1.18 (2.24)  0.42 (1.85)  0.71 (2.11) -0.32 (1.91) 
     Dialogue  0.19 (0.58)  0.10 (0.49)  0.16 (0.51)  0.19 (0.53) 
     Locations  0.37 (1.13)  0.39 (1.17)  0.09 (1.13)  0.09 (1.19) 
     Fantastic/improbable  -0.29 (0.87) -0.05 (0.77) -0.02 (0.35) -0.09 (0.99) 
     Contradictions __________ __________  0.09 (0.36)  0.07 (0.32) 
TRUE-BIASED VS FALSE ACTIVITIES 
     Subjects  1.25 (2.22)  1.25 (2.32) -0.49 (2.98) -0.02 (2.17) 
     Objects  1.04 (2.79)  1.37 (3.18)  0.10 (3.29)  0.52 (2.14) 
     Actions  1.52 (4.85)  1.87 (3.65) -0.09 (4.57) -0.01 (2.66) 
     Temporal markers  0.47 (1.57)  0.19 (0.95) -0.02 (1.01)  0.25 (1.08) 
     Descriptives  1.34 (2.86)  0.52 (2.35)  0.92 (2.52) -0.28 (1.98) 
     Dialogue  0.10 (0.44)  0.02 (0.50)  0.12 (0.43)  0.07 (0.26) 
     Locations  0.34 (0.94)  0.46 (1.33) -0.04 (0.95)  0.03 (1.03) 
      Fantastic/ improbable -0.20 (0.93) -0.14 (0.84) -0.08 (0.23) -0.08 (1.02) 
      Contradictions __________ __________ 0.03 (0.28) -0.01 (0.27) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 36 
Table 6.  
Mean proportion of errors reported across the interviews, activities and SES groups. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Condition Brought Confabulation Interviewer Confusion 
 other   suggestion within 
 activity    activity 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Second Interview 
True-Unbiased 
 High SES 0.33 (.35) 0.59 (.38)  ________ 0.08 (.20) 
 Low SES 0.30 (.31) 0.60 (.33)  ________ 0.09 (.20) 
True-Biased  
 High SES 0.25 (.29) 0.61 (.32)  0.04 (.14) 0.10 (.19) 
 Low SES 0.22 (.26) 0.63 (.31)  0.04 (.14) 0.11 (.22) 
False 
 High SES 0.20 (.20) 0.47 (.28) 0.32 (.29) ________ 
 Low SES 0.38 (.39) 0.40 (.35) 0.22 (.28) ________ 
Third Interview 
True-Unbiased 
 High SES 0.40 (.35) 0.53 (.36)  ________ 0.03 (.14) 
 Low SES 0.33 (.30) 0.58 (.32)  ________ 0.03 (.13) 
True-Biased 
 High SES 0.24 (.30) 0.58 (.34) 0.10 (.24) 0.08 (.20) 
 Low SES 0.23 (.23) 0.64 (.26) 0.07 (.11) 0.06 (.08) 
False 
 High SES 0.21 (.18) 0.49 (.27) 0.29 (.30) ________ 
 Low SES 0.40 (.37) 0.40 (.35) 0.19 (.27) ________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. N (high SES) = 49, N (low SES) = 
57.  
